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The Constitution and the Moral Order-
Professor Bennett's Response to Comments
I am grateful to the commentators for their contributions. I shall
not make a long response. Taking their points into account, I do not
believe the paper requires major alteration. There are a few criticisms
to which I shall briefly respond, and a few offers of advice about the
extension of my thesis that deserve comment. At the end, I would
like to offer an example of what I have in mind as the kind of citizen
activity that constitutes eunomia, individual action which supports and
strengthens important values of law and other values.
I. Professor Rhinelander
Professor Rhinelander presents three criticisms or "reservations."
First, he asserts that I take insufficient note of the many different
questions involving the relationship of law and morality, and thereby
obscure "some significant issues."1  Second, he posits that I (and
others upon whom I depend) do not consider whether the American
constitutional system is worth preserving, and that this "most funda-
mental of all questions in the area of law and morals" should not be
"hidden behind other questions."2 Finally, he argues that my interpre-
tation of Thoreau is mistaken and internally incoherent, because
Thoreau believes in "a close causal and functional interaction between
law and morality."8
Certainly, there are many questions that can be asked about the
relationship of law and morality-questions Professor Rhinelander
lists,4 questions Professor Hart lists,5 and questions others can list.
Many of these are interesting, and many I have not considered. Never-
theless, one need not always deal with many questions in order to deal
productively with one. The question I have considered is interesting;
1. Rhinelander, Law, Morality, and Thoreau, 3 HAsTrINGS CONST. L.Q. 919 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Rhinelander].
2. Id. at 923.
3. Id. at 925.
4. Id. at 921-23.
5. H.L.A. HART, LAw, LmERTY AND MoRarry (1963).
[9411
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
it is coherent; and it is not diminished in significance because there are
other questions that might have been considered. The paper does
not "obscure" other important questions: it simply does not deal with
them and need not deal with them collectively. Philosophers often
discourse as if the only thing worth one's philosophic time were the
raising of questions and more questions-as if philosophy were simply
the raising of questions. To be sure, raising questions can be a worth-
while and sensible activity. But we (and our students) should re-
member that answers-the best ones we can give-are also significant.
This is particularly true when a question is important, and failure to
consider it and attempt to answer it will leave us in the dark about
things that are important to know. I submit that there are things,
like my question, which we could know something about if we tried
to learn. As philosophers, we are not forced inevitably to accept the
characterization of philosophy suggested in the story of the man who,
seeing a sign in a window saying, "Clothes Pressed Here" takes his
clothes in and is told by the manager, "Oh no, we don't press clothes
here. We only make signs."
The observation that I (along with Learned Hand and others)
never consider "the most fundamental question," whether the Ameri-
can constitutional system is worth preserving, is false. This is what
section four of my paper is all about. 6 On the merits, any reasonable
United States citizen at all knowledgeable of history, before or after
Watergate, should have no difficulty recognizing that the American
constitutional system is worth preserving. The Constitution is, and
appropriately so, the most imitated political document in the world. If
there is any doubt about my position, let it be set aside: I insist that
the American constitutional system is worth preserving. If this is "the
most fundamental question," it is fortunate for us that it is easy to an-
swer.
In regard to my understanding of Thoreau and the separation of
domains, I must decline responsibility for Thoreau's mistakes. He
made them, not I; I did not write Civil Disobedience.7  Professor
Rhinelander concludes that I have been victimized by a metaphor
that leads me to postulate separate domains for law and morality."
Clearly, I accept no such separation in the paper; in its entirety, and
6. Bennett, The Constitution and the Moral Order, 3 HASnNGS CONST. L.Q. 899,
914-18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bennett].
7. H. THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, in THE WoRKs oF THOREAU 789 (H. Canby
ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as THOREAU].
8. Rhinelander, supra note 1, at 928.
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especially in section four, it is an argument against any such separation.
This, of course, is precisely one of the problems with the "myth of
rights."'
Although Professor Rhinelander says Thoreau sees a "close causal
and functional interaction between law and morality" in Civil Disobedi-
ence, Thoreau himself says the following: "Government is at best but
an expedient . . . ."10 "Law never made men a whit more just . . .,,"
"[Tihe State never intentionally confronts a man's sense, intellectual or
moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit
or honesty, but with superior physical strength."' 2  "It [government]
can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede
to it. 1" "It [the American Government] is a sort of wooden gun to the
people themselves."' 4
I submit again that this evidence suggests a separation of domains
in Thoreau's (not my) view. The most reasonable inference from
these statements, and from a careful reading of Civil Disobedience, is
the allegation that morality is present in the individual and not in the
government or the laws. Of course there are some interactions be-
tween law and morality of the sort Professor Rhinelander suggests, but
that is hardly the issue; the issue is the implications of Thoreau's belief
in an original, clear, and distinct separation between government and law
on the one hand, and the individual and his morality on the other. For
Thoreau, law as law is originally devoid of morality and needs to be
instructed by the deliverances of individual conscience. Again, this
is Thoreau's position; my entire argument is against it.
Professor Rhinelander suggests that by "expediency" Thoreau
(and others) might not intend to exclude morality, and thereby claim
a mixing of, or interaction between, the domains. Of course when
Thoreau says "government is at best but an expedient," he could mean
many things; for example, Thoreau could be a closet utilitarian, but the
evidence suggests strongly that he is not. I submit that Thoreau's point
was to set up a contrast, a contrast between government and law on
the one hand, and the individual moral conscience on the other.
Finally, by my account of Thoreau it is not difficult to comprehend
why Thoreau lived the way he did, separating himself from law and
9. Bennett, supra note 6, at 914-15.
10. THOREAU, supra note 7, at 789.
11. Id. at 791.
12. Id. at 801.
13. Id. at 808.
14. Id. at 790.
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government, a fact Professor Rhinelander and I both regret. It is just
this kind of separation in action that can occur as a consequence of
opting for a belief in the ethical sufficiency of conscience and a sepa-
ration of domains.
II. Professor Pineoffs
Professor Pincoffs suggests that my concern to "rally 'round" cer-
tain values may underplay "the essential role of the ongoing criticism
of accepted values." 5  This is a good caution; I would add only that
for a citizen all kinds of "rallying 'round" must at the same time be
occasions for what Madison called the exercise of "loving criticism."
Creed and belief as well as practice require ongoing criticism as well
as affirmation. It is only an apparent oxymoron that we need to em-
brace principles while we continue to raise questions about them. Af-
firmation need not exclude ongoing criticism; thoughtful affirmation
presumes it. Certainly I do not recommend mindless praise and ac-
ceptance.
I agree with Professor Pincoffs as well about the difficulty of an
argument from consensus 6 -an argument certainly implied in my
paper-but I also agree with his conclusion that "it is the only consen-
sus we have."' 7 The consensus is indeed not as stable as one would
like, and there will always be disagreement about how to put "consen-
sus values" into practice. Politics, like much of life, is ineluctably and
appropriately a business of accommodation. We need principles "at
a middle distance" to affirm, and ongoing criticism of these principles
so that we do not become enslaved by them. And finally we need to
barter about them in a fair and free marketplace, the marketplace that
politics should provide.
III. Professor Delattre
Professor Delattre's suggestions for extension of my thesis are
well-taken and illuminating. The argument about the problems of
teaching values at a distance is quite apposite."8 Professor Delattre ap-
preciates what Professor Rhinelander notes critically about Thoreau:
15. Pincoffs, Bennett on the Moral Order, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 933, 935
(1976).
16. id. at 934-35.
17. Id. at 934.
18. Delattre, On "The Constitution and the Moral Order," 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 937, 939 (1976).
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the primary importance of practice, of how one lives in regard to the
constant maintenance both of the moral order and of a healthy relation-
ship of law and morality. In Professor Delattre's words, this leads
to the recommendation for "intimacy with moral principles and ideals
. . . in the experiences of daily life."' 9 His examples and models are
more than incidental.
Professor Delattre's article suggests a story to me with which I
should like to conclude this response. It is an example of a citizen's ap-
propriate understanding of how important values, expressed in and under-
lying the law, are to be supported. John, a good friend of mine, is
a medical student who lives in Boston. One evening he discovered his
wife's bicycle missing from their porch. His neighbor's children
reported that they saw "a big boy," about thirteen years old, taking it
down the street. John got into a friend's car, and the two men went
to look for the bike. A few blocks away John spotted the boy riding
the bike; when he got out of the car, the boy dropped the bike and
ran. John chased him, finally caught up with him behind a fence, and
told the boy that he was going to take him to the police station. The
boy was afraid and quite anxious about being caught by John, who is
physically imposing; he was also very frightened at the prospect of
going to the police station. John and the boy were driven to the station
by the friend, who reported their conversation:
John: You know that what you did was wrong and you have to
take the responsibility for it.
Boy: I didn't mean to do it. Don't take me to the police station.
John: What would you do if your bike was stolen?
Boy: Lots of things of mine have been stolen, but no one ever
does anything about it.
John: Well, we have to do something about it. We have lots of
thefts in this neighborhood and it has to stop. We have to
live together, respect each other's property.
Boy: Don't take me to the police station. They'll beat me up.
John: I won't let them beat you up. They won't do that. I'll go
in with you and I'll be sure they don't. I'll stay with you
the whole time.
Boy: I'm afraid.
John: Don't be afraid. I said I'd stay with you and I will.
Upon arriving at the station, John walked in with his arm around
the boy and stayed with him while talking to the desk sergeant. A
probation officer was assigned. John promised the boy that he would
19. Id.
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stay posted on what happened and would make sure the boy was not
mistreated. He explained to the officer in charge that the boy was
nervous and very worried about being hurt, and that he wanted to
stay with him as long as he could that evening and be kept advised
of developments in the case.
John's action is an example not of blind or mindless action, but of
respect for law, and for the values that underlie law and must inform
its rule. Here was vital and active recognition that such values are
not self-executing, but require the attention and probity of citizens in
daily, commonplace matters. Here, in short, was a little piece of
eunomia, and as the conversation reveals, it contrasted sharply with
what the boy himself had experienced up to that time. One cannot
be a citizen alone.
